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While our nation was wholly occupied with the war on illicit drugs, a
different deadly addiction has been creeping into doctors' offices to lawfully
occupy us. Prescription painkiller abuse, or abuse of mainly opioid-based
medicines like OxyContin, is now the leading contributor to drug overdoses
and overdose deaths in the United States.' A war to successfully defeat pain-
killer addiction must be different in scope and nature than the other war on
illicit street drugs in a number of meaningful ways. For one, the public ap-
pears to view prescription drug abuse as less dangerous than illicit drug use,
perhaps because these drugs are available lawfully through the medical sys-
tem and are seen as curative.2 Likewise, abusers of opioids have been por-
trayed more sympathetically than other illicit drug users, again perhaps
because many users initially came by the drugs lawfully.3 And while the war
on drugs takes place in illegal markets with underground actors, prescription
painkillers are often lawfully prescribed by physicians and paid for by health
insurers.
Some lessons from the war on drugs can be meaningfully extrapolated
to the present painkiller epidemic. For example, we can learn from the long
history of the war on drugs that drug enforcement, particularly criminaliza-
tion, is costly and can target vulnerable groups.4 But the prescription pain-
* The author is an Associate Professor at the West Virginia University (WVU) College of
Law specializing in health law and policy. This article is dedicated to my fellow members of
the WVU Substance Abuse Task Force who continuously inspire me in their dedication to
overcoming the challenges of addiction in West Virginia.
' Deaths from opioids account for over six out of every ten overdose deaths. Understand-
ing the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
drugoverdose/epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/XS86-TXVJ]. Because of this dangerous trend in
opioids, the article focuses on prescription painkiller abuse, but other prescription drugs like
Adderall or Xanax can also be abused.
2 See Deborah Ahrens, Drug Panics in the Twenty-First Century: Ecstasy, Prescription
Drugs, and the Reframing of the War on Drugs, 6 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 397, 418 (2013)
("[P]ortrayal of persons using the drug seems to have shifted from 'dangerous' to 'relatable'
.... Addictions often start innocently and unintentionally, and the persons who intentionally
use prescription drugs often are described as having done so under the erroneous impression
that doing so is safe because the drugs can lawfully be prescribed.").
3 See id. This difference, coupled with lessons learned from the broader war on drugs, may
explain in part why criminalization of opioid abusers has been discouraged as a major policy
initiative. This contrasts sharply with government policy with respect to illegal drug users.
4 For essential reading on the "erosion of civil liberties" posed by the war on drugs, see
Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993). For a modern synopsis of the harms of the war on drugs and its
broader application to criminal law reform, see Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORD-
HAm L. REV. 2173 (2016). For racial implications of the drug war, see Frank Rudy Cooper, The
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killer epidemeic is a different enemy than illicit drugs, requiring different
tactical approaches to fight it. An iatrogenic drug epidemic requires an ia-
trogenic cure. Thus, while criminal law certainly has its place in this epi-
demic, for example by targeting physicians who unlawfully abuse their
prescriptions pads, prescription painkiller abuse is better handled by changes
to how we regulate our healthcare system, in terms of both delivery and
payment.
There is significant bipartisan support for making policy to address this
epidemic. In 2016, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Comprehensive
Addiction and Recovery Act, the first major legislation in forty years in-
tended to tackle the opioid crisis.' The law is far-reaching, authorizing $181
million annually to tackle opioid abuse through prevention and educational
programming, drug disposal programs, and other measures. While the Act
tackles almost every dimension of opioid prescribing and abuse, it missed an
opportunity by failing to consider health insurers and the role they can and
must play in tackling this epidemic.6
Indeed, regulators have widely ignored insurers in prescription pain-
killer abuse reforms, instead focusing mainly on prescribers and patients.
This is unfortunate because insurers hold significant power to mitigate or
exacerbate this epidemic.' They pay for most of the opioids being prescribed
and thus have significant leverage over prescriber patterns and how many
drugs end up in the hands of patients. Moreover, insurers are typically the
gateway to addiction treatment, which may be prohibitively expensive other-
wise. Thus, they play a powerful role in controlling who gets these drugs and
who gets treatment for addiction.
Insurers also have an incentive to defeat this epidemic because it is
expensive. A recent study found that the average cost of covering an insured
was $3,453 per year, but this rose to $19,333 when the insured had opioid
Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and
Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002). For gender implications, see Marne L. Lenox, Neutraliz-
ing the Gendered Collateral Consequences of the War on Drugs, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280
(2011).
Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695 (2016),
passed with a shocking 94-1 votes in the Senate and 400-5 votes in the House.
S.524-Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/senate-bill/524/actions [https://perma.cc/8GTD-DTRW].
6 The Act addressed payers in very limited ways and only with respect to easing access to
overdose prevention drugs. It provides funds for Veterans Hospitals to increase access to
naloxone (a fast-acting opioid overdose drug) by eliminating or reducing copays to purchase
the drug and to attend educational sessions on how to use these drugs. It also creates grants to
waive copays for these drugs in other insurance programs. Pub. L. No. 114-198, https://www
.conaress.gov/114/plaws/publ198/PLAW-114publ198.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8WZ-Z3FJ].
"[The] problem of prescription drug abuse and overdose is complex and multi-faceted.
There are multiple drivers of the problem, such as provider clinical practices; insufficient over-
sight to curb inappropriate prescribing; insurance and pharmacy benefit policies; and a belief
by many people that prescription drugs are not dangerous, which is associated with increased
use." PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE SUBCOMM., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., Ao-




addiction.' Insurers must also worry about the attendant costs of communi-
cable diseases that we will see as prescription painkiller abusers increasingly
turn to intravenous drugs like heroin.'
While insurers have both the power and the motivation to curb the prac-
tice of harmful opioid prescribing, they may go about it in ways that could
be counter-productive to larger public health goals. After all, insurers have
historically discriminated against addiction like any other condition that
leads to costly healthcare consumption. In the past, insurers have avoided
enrolling addicted insureds and have limited rehabilitation services. To ad-
dress this epidemic, insurers might engage in ways that could harm third
parties. For example, to the extent they are permitted, insurers might avoid
addicted enrollees altogether, or might limit coverage of addiction treat-
ments in order to save money. They may overcorrect, sharply curbing most
opioid prescriptions and relishing the money saved, while ignoring the
harms to patients who depend on this form of pain management. Or they
might focus too much on curbing prescriptions because it is cost-saving,
while focusing less attention on adequate addiction treatment, which costs
money. After all, their broader goal is typically not to improve the public's
health, but to predict and avoid risk.
Insurers are already beginning to act on their own, for example by mon-
itoring their insureds for opioid abuse and limiting opioids for some patients.
Regulators need to be aware of insurer conduct and should monitor it for
which practices are or are not likely to achieve positive outcomes in this
public health crisis.10 While insurers must be engaged in this epidemic, they
must also be regulated to ensure that their efforts help and do not harm the
broader goals of preventing and treating addiction. The Affordable Care Act
(ACA) can play an important role in requiring insurers to cover necessary
addiction rehabilitation and to act in ways that do not discriminate against
addicted insureds. However, the various consumer protections in the ACA
and its implementing rules are at risk under the new administration. Insur-
ance regulation is necessary if insurers are to be meaningfully engaged in the
battle over opioids-we cannot assume that insurers' interests will always
align with broader public health goals. Discrimination will be a serious risk
'Julie Appleby, Insurance Data Show a Surge in Spending on Opioid Treatment and
Testing, NPR (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/09/12/4936184
15/insurance-data-show-a-surge-in-spending-on-opioid-treatment-and-testing [https://perma
.cc/EW3G-QXZ3].
9 For example, increased IV drug use could increase the spread of HIV and Hepatitis C.
The latter issue has become a source of increased strife among health policymakers and insur-
ers over whether to cover Sovaldi, an $84,000 treatment that can cure Hepatitis C. For more on
the debate over Sovaldi and possible policy responses, see Soumitri Barua et al., Restrictions
for Medicaid Reimbursement of Sofosbuvir for the Treatment of Hepatitis C Virus Infection in
the United States, 163 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 215, 215-16, 220 (2015).
0 It is impossible to predict the future of health reform in the near or distant future. For a
fairly recent discussion of possible reforms that we might see when conservatives are in
power, see Timothy Jost, Taking Stock of Health Reform: Where We've Been, Where We're
Going, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Dec. 6, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/12/06/taking-
stock-of-health-reform-where-weve-been-where-were-going/ [https://perma.cc/9YYP-SCS5].
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if the ACA and its protections are repealed and regulators must be prepared
to identify and address this risk.
This article explores the promises and perils of engaging health insurers
in tackling this epidemic. Of course, insurers are only one actor in the cycle
of prescription pill prescribing and dispensing. Doctors, pharmacies, drug
makers, patients, and others are all stakeholders who must be considered and
engaged to truly address this crisis. However, insurers play a central role in
the dispensing of prescriptions and have received inadequate attention from
both academics and regulators. In focusing on insurers, I focus mainly on
healthcare reforms practices but other areas of law also play a role in ending
the opioid crisis, for example, criminal law, tort law," labor and employ-
ment law,12 and disability law." Lastly, the prescription painkiller epidemic
is fueling an illegal heroin market for those who cannot access opioid pre-
scription painkillers for cost or other reasons.14 This article focuses only on
lawful channels of painkillers, recognizing that further discussion is needed
to address the equally important topic of abuse of illicit substances. Im-
provements in the dispensing of opioid painkillers may, in the long term,
help to reduce heroin abuse by reducing the overall percentage of the popu-
lation who become addicted to opioids.5 In the short term, however, any
efforts to decrease the availability of opioids through lawful channels could
lead those currently addicted to turn to heroin as opioids become costlier and
harder to obtain.
This paper begins in Part I by describing the origins and the harms of
prescription painkiller abuse. Part I turns to regulatory efforts to combat this
epidemic. It briefly provides context for the reader about wider efforts to
address prescription painkiller abuse including pharmacy and prescriber re-
forms, before turning to the role that insurers can play in changing these
practices. Part II also describes practices that insurers are already engaging
in to alter the course of the epidemic including (1) ways that insurers are
" For a discussion of the role of criminal and civil litigation against drug makers who may
have contributed to the prescription drug epidemic, see Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Liti-
gation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REv. 1117 (2014).
12 Labor and employment law can play an important role in combating opioid abuse,
partly because workplace injuries and workplace compensation are a frequent area where
opioids are initially prescribed and sometimes later abused. For details on this issue, see The
Role of Insurers in Preventing Misuse and Abuse of Controlled Substances, PREVENTING PRE-
SCRIPTION ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, Pus. HEALTH, http://
publichealth.hsc.wvu.edu/media/4023/insurers-pire_4_web5O8.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQN3-
PFC5]. For a discussion of workers' rights and interests with respect to addiction in the work-
place, see Elisa Y. Lee, An American Way of Life: Prescription Drug Use in the Modern ADA
Workplace, 45 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 303 (2011).
1 For a wider discussion of disability protections as applied to alcohol and drug abusers,
see Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Expanding Drug
Treatment in Communities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 631 (2005).
14 Steve Almasy, Opioid Epidemic is Getting Worse, Says CDC, CNN (Dec. 9, 2016, 2:35
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12108/health/opioid-deaths-2015/ [https://perma.cc/8K2Y-
NNHC].
" Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health
Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 560 (2015).
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preventing future abuse of prescription painkillers and (2) ways that insurers
can and are improving services for those who already suffer from addiction.
In Part III, the article argues that regulators must regulate insurance practices
to ensure that they achieve the broader goals of preventing and treating ad-
diction. New regulations will be particularly critical if the ACA is repealed.
I. PRESCRIPTION PAINKILLER ABUSE AS AN EPIDEMIC
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recognizes prescription
painkiller abuse as an epidemic requiring widespread public health interven-
tion.1 6 Over twenty thousand people died of an overdose from prescription
opioids in 2015, and an additional nearly thirteen thousand people died from
heroin overdose." Drug overdoses, as a general matter, have more than
doubled in the last fourteen years, and prescription drug overdoses now ac-
.count for half.'" Deaths from opioid overdoses specifically have quadrupled
since 1999.19
The epidemic creates a significant strain on the healthcare resources of
the country. Enough prescriptions for opioids were written in 2012 to give
every American his or her own bottle.2 0 Americans, making up 4.4% of the
world's population, consume 80% of its opioids.21 This translates into in-
creased need for addiction treatment. U.S. emergency rooms see one thou-
sand patients per day for treatment related to opioid addiction,22 with
addiction treatment-seeking increasing 900% between 1997 and 2011.23
, The roots of this epidemic are complex. Early American medicine re-
lied heavily on opioids, particularly before its addictive properties were well
understood.24 For example, morphine was once regularly spooned out in the
16 Leonard Paulozzi et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Prescription Drug Overdoses-A U.S.
Epidemic, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Jan. 13, 2012).
" Underlying Cause of Death 1999-2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS. Heroin deaths increased by twenty percent between 2014
and 2015. Heroin Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https:/www
.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/heroin.html [https://perma.cc/H3A4-SGCH].
I Deaths from Injuries Up Significantly Over Past Four Years in 17 States, ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (June 17, 2015), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/articles-and-news/
2015/06/deaths-from-injuries-up-significantly-over-past-four-years-in-17.html [https://perma
.cc/83WX-YY9J].
19 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 1.
20 The total amount then was 259 million prescriptions. Opioid Painkiller Prescribing,
CDC VITAL SIGNS (July 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsignslopioid-prescribing [https://per
ma.cc/DWK7-NS83].
21 Id.
22 Prescription Opioid Overdose Data, CDC (last updated Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.cdc
.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html [https://perma.cc/RGE5-UP6H].
23 Kolodny et al., supra note 15, at 560 (discussing Substance Abuse Mental Health Ser-
vices data sets on treatment episodes and discharge from treatment).
24 See Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Policy in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 841, 849 (2010).
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form of Mrs. Winslow's Soothing Syrup to silence fussy children., Recrea-
tional use, meanwhile, waxed and waned based on the availability of the
drugs, as well as the popularity of other substances like alcohol and co-
caine.2 6 The stage for the modem epidemic was set in the early 1990s with
the growing recognition, predominantly driven by organized medical socie-
ties, that chronic pain was underdiagnosed and undertreated in patients.27
The Federation of State Medical Boards encouraged state boards to punish
physicians who undertreated pain.28 The American Pain Society advocated
for pain as a "fifth vital sign," to be assessed each time a patient had contact
with a doctor as a measurement of their well being, just like body tempera-
ture, pulse, or blood pressure.29 Responding to this progressive pain move-
ment, pharmaceutical companies began reshaping their marketing
approaches to create a bigger audience for opioid painkillers.3 0 Painkillers
were originally reserved for acute and limited episodes of pain, like during
cancer treatment or immediately following a surgery.3 ' However, pharma-
ceutical companies distributed information to clinicians suggesting that
opioid painkillers could be prescribed safely for long-term use without risk
of addiction in most patients.32 They recommended use of these drugs not
only for patients suffering from acute and temporary pain but also for
chronic pain patients.33 Thus, the market for prescription painkillers ex-
panded, with greater populations of patients using increasing amounts of
opioids as their tolerance grew over time.34 This marketing has been fre-
quently challenged in the courts as unlawful on a number of legal bases
25 James Nevius, The Strange History of Opiates in America: From Morphine for Kids to




27 Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physi-
cians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM.
J.L. MED. 7 (2016); see also Andrea M. Garcia, State Laws Regulating Prescribing of Con-
trolled Substances: Balancing the Public Health Problems of Chronic Pain and Prescription
Painkiller Abuse and Overdose, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHics 42 (2013).
28 Celine Gounder, Who Is Responsible for the Pain-Pill Epidemic? NEW YORKER (Nov. 8,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/who-is-responsible-for-the-pain-pill-epi-
demic [https://perma.cc/J6CQ-XLLE].
29 Dineen & Dubois, supra note 27; Garcia, supra note 27.
30 See Kelly K. Dineen, Addressing Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context: Syn-
chronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple Complex Public Health Problems, 40 L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. 1, 3 (2016) [hereinafter Dineen, PSYCHOL. REV] ("The aggressive and illegal marketing
by some pharmaceutical companies undoubtedly influenced prescribing of opioids and may
have led some physicians to believe, albeit unreasonably, that some of the newer drugs, such
as Oxycontin, were safer than in reality. In turn, some doctors may have been less careful than
warranted in instructing patients.").
31 Id.
32 "Purdue trained its sales representatives to carry the message that the risk of addiction
was 'less than one percent."' Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Com-





including: criminal complaints, negligence, products liability, fraudulent
misrepresentation, negligent marketing, and violation of state consumer
protections."
Because this epidemic stemmed from inappropriate prescription of
painkillers in a medical context, many of the population currently addicted
to prescription painkillers began as chronic pain patients. Approximately one
hundred million Americans suffer from chronic pain.3 6 These patients obtain
the drug lawfully from physicians who diagnose them with chronic condi-
tions, like back pain or arthritis. Some of these patients become addicted to
the medicine over time, turning to illegitimate abuse of the drug.37 Many
people, alternatively, began taking prescription painkillers without ever hav-
ing a legitimate prescription or medical need (sometimes called nonmedical
users).38 These individuals might divert painkillers from family or friends or
purchase them off the street.39 Both medical and non-medical users may en-
gage in "compulsive drug-seeking" in which they misrepresent medical
needs in order to obtain or increase amounts of prescriptions for illegitimate
uses.40 Opioid abusers may engage in doctor shopping (seeing multiple phy-
sicians for multiple prescriptions) and may fill prescriptions across different
states and in different pharmacies or by paying cash-all methods to avoid
detection as frequent users.41
The prescription painkiller epidemic has created a third population,
those who began abusing prescription painkillers but have turned to illicit
opioids like heroin and illegal fentanyl because they are cheaper and easier
to obtain than prescription painkillers.42 Heroin and fentanyl interact with the
brain in the same way as prescription painkillers because all are opioid drugs
that interact with opioid brain receptors. To a person addicted to opioids,
either painkillers or street drugs will have the same effect.43 While heroin is
3 Ausness, supra note 11.
"AAPM Facts and Figures on Pain, AM. ACAD. PAIN MED., http://www.painmed.org/
patientcenter/factsson-pain.aspx#incidence [https://perma.cc/2R4S-LM28].
3 About nine million opioid abusers can be classified in this category. Paulozzi et al.,
supra note 16; see also Kolodny et al., supra note 15. Medical users are frequently adults,
while teenage populations more frequently use the drug recreationally. Opioid overdoses occur
more in medical users than in non-medical users. For example, in a Utah study of 254 opioid
overdose deaths, ninety-two percent of all deaths involved a legitimate medical prescription.
Erin M. Johnson et al., Unintentional Prescription Opioid-Related Overdose Deaths: Descrip-
tion of Decedents by Next of Kin or Best Contact, Utah, 2008-2009, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 522 (2013).
38 About five million people fit into this category. Kolodny et al., supra note 15.
39 Id.
40 See Joanna Shepherd, Combating the Prescription Painkiller Epidemic: A National Pre-
scription Drug Reporting Program, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 86 (2014).
41 Id.
42 Kolodny et al., supra note 15. Dependence and overdose from illicit forms of opioids
are growing problems. The CDC recently reported that deaths from illegally-made fentanyl
and heroin rose seventy-three percent in 2015, as compared to an increase in prescription
opioid deaths in that year of only four percent. Almasy, supra note 14.
43 What is Heroin?, NATL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGFACTS (Jan. 2017), https://www
.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/heroin [https://perma.cc/MJ4K-WP25].
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a problem in its own right, it is closely linked to the prescription painkiller
crisis, with four out of every five new heroin users stating that his or her
addiction began through abuse of painkillers.44
Today, in the face of an epidemic, several goals are in tension. Policy-
makers must prevent new cases of addiction, while also identifying and
treating those who already are suffering from addiction.45 They must balance
efforts to limit painkillers with ensuring that patients who need painkillers
appropriately and safely receive them.46 And they must recognize the dual
dimensions of a lawful market and an illicit market both feeding this
epidemic.47
II. REGULATORY APPROACHES To ADDRESSING PRESCRIPTION
PAINKILLER ABUSE
Many intersecting efforts by the federal government, various agencies,
and the states across various types of law (employment, healthcare, and
others) will be necessary to effectively grapple with the prescription pain-
killer epidemic crisis.48 No single legal approach will suffice to fully address
the problems of the prescription painkiller epidemic. Medical and non-medi-
cal users who abuse painkillers may be affected by strategies to reduce
harmful prescribing of those substances. But many efforts aimed at the fi-
nancing and delivery of healthcare will not properly reach those using illicit
substances. This part briefly describes wider efforts in the healthcare field to
prevent opioid abuse, before turning to the role for insurers in this regard.
" C.M. Jones, Heroin Use and Heroin Use Risk Behaviors Among Nonmedical Users of
Prescription Opioid Pain Relievers-United States, 2002-2004 and 2008-2010, 132 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 95, 96 (2013). The shift from legal prescriptions to illegal heroin is in
part being driven by reduced availability of pills and, relatedly, the rising price of these pills
when compared with heroin. Opioid Addiction 2016 Facts & Figures, Am. Soc'v ADDICTION
MED., http://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/opioid-addiction-disease-facts-fi
gures.pdf [https://perma.cclNHJ3-ZW83].
4 JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH ET AL., THE PRESCRIPTION OPiolo
EPIDEMIC: AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH (G.C. Alexander et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter
JOHNS HOPKINS].
46 For a discussion of relevant policy considerations in striking a balance between addic-
tion and appropriate pain management, see Kelly K. Dineen, Moral Disengagement of Medical
Providers: Another Clue to the Continued Neglect of Treatable Pain?, 13 Hous. J. HEALTH L.
& PoL'Y 163, 188 (2013). See also Sigrid Frey-Revere & Elizabeth K. Do, A Chronic Problem:
Pain Management of Non-Cancer Pain in America, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 193, 205
(2013).
47 JOHNS HOPKINS, supra note 45.
48 See Kent Duming, No Pain No Gain?! Who Will Make the Greatest Sacrifices in Curb-
ing Opioid Analgesic Diversion and Abuse? 93 Ky. L.J. 199, 241 (2004) (highlighting the
comprehensive approaches to addressing opioid abuse in Kentucky by state and federal agen-
cies and the need for coordination therein).
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A. Healthcare System Reforms
Reforms are occurring at every level of the supply chain between pill
and patient. The makers of prescription painkillers are being incentivized to
produce less addictive painkillers and are monitored for how they market
addictive substances.4 9 Patients are receiving more education on the risks of
addiction, along with greater access to resources to seek help for drug abuse
problems and to safely handle and dispose of unused prescriptions o as to
avoid diversion.50
Perhaps the most significant reforms have targeted the writing and fill-
ing of prescriptions. At the prescriber level, there have been increasing ef-
forts to prosecute physicians who purposefully prescribe harmful substances
with criminal intent." Likewise, significant reforms of pain clinics are un-
derway.5 2 For the majority of prescribers who mean well but may simply be
insufficiently informed about pain management, educational initiatives are
stressing proper prescribing practices." Most prominently, in 2016 the CDC
released clinical guidelines on safe opioid prescribing practices.M Pharma-
49 For example, the FDA is increasingly approving painkillers that are more difficult to
abuse. See FDA Approves New Pain Pill Designed to Be Hard to Abuse, TIME (July 24, 2014),
http://time.com/3031100/fda-pain-bill-targiniq-er/ [https://perma.cc/JN4L-QA9K].
' JOHNS HOPKINS, supra note 45.
5 Shepherd, supra note 40. For more on why and when physicians wrongfully prescribe,
see Dineen & Dubois, supra note 27. See also Dineen, PSYCHOL. REV., supra note 30. For a
critique of criminal enforcements as a strategy to combat opioid abuse, see Diane E. Hoff-
mann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in
Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, I ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 231, 235 (2008)
("Because many physicians fear criminal sanctions for prescribing opioids, pain sufferers may
not be able to receive adequate pain care. The law enforcement climate surrounding prescrib-
ing opioid analgesics appears to be causing some physicians to stop prescribing opioids or stop
treating chronic pain patients, reducing an already very small number of physicians willing to
treat these needy patients. As a result, the physicians who continue to see patients with chronic
pain also make themselves an easy target for law enforcement officials.").
52 Garcia, supra note 27.
* For an argument on the federal government's right to mandate prescriber education on
opioids and the role this policy effort can play in reducing the prescription pill epidemic, see
Michael C. Barnes & Gretchen Arndt, The Best of Both Worlds: Applying Federal Commerce
and State. Police Powers to Reduce Prescription Drug Abuse, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y
271, 274 (2013). Interestingly, providers end up in a split role, fearing prosecution themselves,
but also in the power to monitor and report patients for criminal conduct. For a discussion of
the strain on doctors of placing criminalization into the patient-physician relationship, see Eliz-
abeth Chiarello, The War on Drugs Comes to the Pharmacy Counter: Frontline Work in the
Shadow of Discrepant Institutional Logics, 40 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 86, 87 (2015).
' For more on physician prescribing issues with respect to the opioid epidemic, see
Barnes & Arndt, supra note 53 (advocating for the Controlled Substances Act to require edu-
cation on safe prescription pill prescribing as a condition of obtaining permission to prescribe).
See also Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act, Public L. No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695
(2016) (promoting continuing education requirements for prescription pill prescribers). Regu-
lating providers' prescribing practices is not free of controversy and can be perceived as inter-
fering with physicians' medical judgment. For a thorough discussion of the benefits and
challenges of regulating providers prescribing practices, see Macon Jones, Protecting Dr.
Smith While Treating the Chronic Pain of Mrs. Jones: Why the Indiana Medical Licensing
Board Should Pass Guidelines for Using Controlled Substances for Pain Treatment, 9 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 695, 704-05, 717-18 (2012). Examples of responsible opioid prescribing
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cies that fill painkiller prescriptions are also being regulated to ensure that
they only fill appropriate prescriptions and that they monitor patients for
doctor-shopping." Prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) aid both
providers and pharmacies.5 6 These programs require prescribers to input cer-
tain data every time they prescribe an addictive painkiller to a patient, in-
cluding the name of the patient, the name of the prescriber, and the dose and
type of medicine. Pharmacies can check that information before filling an
opioid prescription." In this way, pharmacies and doctors can be aware of
patients who are doctor-shopping and have multiple prescriptions from mul-
tiple doctors." Prescription drug monitoring programs have also been shown
to help identify and discourage over-prescribers.9
B. Insurance Reforms
While all of these efforts are critical to fighting the prescription pain-
killer epidemic and have demonstrated at least some success in curbing
abuse, insurers must play an equally critical role. Insurers are truly at the
heart of prescribed opioids. They pay for the office visits in which the drugs
are prescribed, the drugs themselves, the treatments when individuals over-
dose or suffer other medical consequences of addiction, and the treatments
practices include requiring urine screens to catch drug diversion and implementing pain con-
tracts with patients to outline the expectations and the limits of the therapeutic relationship if
diversion or abuse is suspected. For a critique of opioid pain contracts, see Daniel S. Goldberg
& Ben Rich, Pharmacovigilance and the Plight of Chronic Pain Patients: In Pursuit of a
Realistic and Responsible Ethic of Care, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 83, 118-20 (2014). For
support of pain contracts as a standard of care in opioid therapy, see Scott M. Fishman et al.,
The Opioid Treatment Agreement: A Real-World Perspective, 10 AM J. BIoETics 14, 14-15
(2010).
1 E-pharmacies, or pharmacies conducted predominantly online, can pose their own
unique risks when it comes to improper filling of opioid prescriptions. For a discussion on how
e-pharmacy abuse can be prevented and regulated, see Amy L. Cadwell, In the War on Pre-
scription Drug Abuse, E-Pharmacies Are Making Doctor Shopping Irrelevant, 7 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & PoLY 85 (2006).
56 For a good summary of how a state PDMP might regulate prescribers and prescribing
practices, see Nathan Trexler, Developments in Delaware Health Law: Addressing Prescrip-
tion Drug Abuse, 14 DEL. L. REV. 29, 30-32 (2013). See also Parker Tricarico, A Nation in the
Throes of Addiction: Why a National Prescription Drug Monitoring Program is Needed Before
It Is Too Late, 37 WHITTER L. REV. 117, 119 (2015) (arguing that PDMPs are underfunded
and underutilized, and advocating for a single federal system to track prescription drug use and
prescribing as opposed to state-by-state programs).
1 Currently, thirty-five states have functional PDMPs and another eleven have authorized
but not fully implemented them. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, OFFICE OF NATL
DRUG CONTROL POL'Y https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/ondcp-fact-sheets/prescrip
tion-drug-monitoring-programs [https://perma.cc/MA93-MKUA].
58 Id.
" See, e.g., Hsien-Yen Chang et al., Impact of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
and Pill Mill Laws On High-Risk Opioid Prescribers: A Comparative Interrupted Time Series
Analysis, 165 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 3-7 (2016) (exploring through time series
analysis the impact of a variety of Florida-based pill mill laws and the establishment of a state
PDMP on the state's highest opioid prescribers).
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for patients abusing these drugs.60 Indeed, the increased coverage of opioid
medicines by insurers appears to drive, in some instances, the increased pre-
scription and consumption of these medicines.6'
Insurers have a vested interest in reducing harmful abuse of opioids and
clear leverage to play as the gatekeeper to access for these pharmaceuticals.
Given this interest, it is unsurprising that insurers, both public and private,
have already begun to make changes to adjust to this painkiller crisis includ-
ing monitoring prescribing patterns and controlling access to opioids by
some patients. However, regulators have paid little attention to the promise
and perils of insurers in this regard. The next section describes current ef-
forts by insurers to stem the tide of prescription painkiller abuse, before
turning to some of the pitfalls of these efforts to which regulators must be
alert.
1. Health Insurers' Interest in Curbing Prescription Painkiller
Abuse
Insurers pay a heavy cost in the over-prescribing crisis.62 Given the rise
in painkiller consumption, spending on opioid painkillers has likewise sig-
nificantly increased, rising from $2.3 billion in 1999 to $7.4 billion in
2012.63 Insurers, both public and private, increasingly shoulder this burden.
While insurers only paid for forty-two percent of all opioid spending in
1999, this rose to eighty-two percent in 2012.6 The effect is particularly
straining on public insurance programs. Medicare and Medicaid paid for
about nine percent of all opioid drug spending in 1999, but since the adop-
tion of Medicare Part D (the prescription drug plan aimed at lowering out-
of-pocket drugs costs for the elderly) in 1996, Medicare alone has covered
almost twenty to thirty percent of the overall pool of spending for opioids in
the country.65
One reason for the increased expenditures by insurers may harken back
to the pain-as-fifth-vital-sign movement, which resulted in increased pres-
sure on insurers to cover painkillers." Moreover, insurers, both public and
private, were generally increasing coverage for drug plans around that same
a See Sonia Moghe, Health Insurance Companies Step Up to Fight the Opioid Epidemic,
CNN (May 19, 2016, 1:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/19/health/health-insurance-
companies-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/8DH6-KRGA].
6' David Powell et al., How Increasing Medical Access to Opioids Contributes to the
Opioid Epidemic: Evidence from Medicare Part D (NBER, Working Paper No. 21072, 2016).
62 Chao Zhou et al., Payments For Opioids Shifted Substantially to Public and Private
Insurers While Consumer Spending Declined, 1999-2012, 35 HEALTH AFF. 824, 826-27
(2016).
63 Id.
' Id. at 828. Consumer spending dropped off during the same time from fifty-three per-
cent to eighteen percent. Id.
65 The majority of Medicare's spending on opioids is for persons under the age of sixty-
five with a long-term disability or end-stage renal disease. Id. at 827.
6 Id. at 824.
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time.67 Perversely, the increased spending by insurers on painkillers may
have contributed to some abuse, as it removed the financial burden for pa-
tients to acquire these medications.68 Insurance coverage appears to correlate
with increased uptake of opioid prescriptions, in that providers may be more
likely to recommend these drugs and patients more able to fill the prescrip-
tions.69 For example, when Medicare Part D expanded to cover opioid pre-
scriptions, a significant uptick of prescriptions of these drugs followed.70
Interestingly, abuse patterns tended to be greater in the nonmedical popula-
tion than the medical population, suggesting some significant amount of di-
version by Medicare patients, whether intentional or unintentional.
Beyond the actual cost of prescriptions, insurers also foot the bill for
some medical care related to addiction. CeltiCare, a Massachusetts-based
managed care insurer that covers Medicaid patients, estimates that a quarter
of the inpatient hospital stays it reimburses each year are a result of sub-
stance abuse, while ten percent of its annual spending went toward subox-
one, a drug used to treat addiction.72
2. Health Insurers' Potential to Curb Prescription Painkiller Abuse
The expenses of this epidemic, shouldered by insurers, create an incen-
tive on their part to heal this broken system. Moreover, the central role they
play in purchasing these medications means they must necessarily be en-
gaged in any regulatory effort.73 This section describes key roles that insurers
can play (and already are playing) on two battlefronts: (a) the prevention of
new cases of prescription painkiller addiction and (b) the treatment and cure
of existing cases of addiction. Many of the actions insurers can take are
already being taken by public insurers and by some private insurers. To the
extent that they prove successful, we can anticipate widespread adoption of
some efforts by most private insurers. Regulators should be aware of these
trends and assess whether they are helpful or harmful to the goals of remedy-
ing this crisis.
67 Id.
' Powell et al., supra note 61.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 15-16.
71 Id.
72 Deborah Becker, Insurers Hire Social Workers to Tackle the Opioid Epidemic, NPR
(Jan. 25, 2016, 2:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/01/25/463870922/in-
surers-hire-social-workers-to-tackle-the-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/Z7N5-6J7U].
7 Insurers are increasingly being asked to take part in the advisory processes to come up
with statewide and national plans to tackle this problem. For example, the New England Com-
parative Effectiveness Public Advisory Council engaged insurance stakeholders and provided
specific guidance for insurance reform with respect to opioid dependence. See New England
Comparative Effectiveness Public Advisory Council Public Meeting-June 20, 2014, Manage-
ment of Patients with Opioid Dependence: A Review of Clinical, Delivery System, and Policy





a. Preventing New Cases of Prescription Painkiller Addiction
Insurers pay for the majority of opioids that are prescribed in this coun-
try.7 4 Insurance claims data can be used-and already is being used-to
monitor who fills prescriptions, how often, and where, to intervene in harm-
ful prescribing relationships and to change the level of availability of pre-
scription drugs overall as described below.
While coverage varies by insurer, one effort insurers can make is to
cover more proven alternatives to addictive painkillers. Insurers at large typ-
ically do not cover certain services that can improve pain but are non-
addictive, like physical therapy, psychological therapy, or aerobic and
aquatic training." Insurers can also promote pain treatments that are less
readily abused. Certain formulations of opioids are harder to abuse; for ex-
ample, some pills activate anti-opioid receptors if the pill is crushed or
snorted, rather than swallowed.6 States are encouraging insurers to cover
these drugs, and insurers can make the drugs easier for physicians to pre-
scribe by eliminating preapproval requirements for these drugs while still
requiring it of other opioids.n7
Insurers, as the payers of these medications, also have great sway in
changing prescribing patterns. Insurers can collaborate with hospitals, prov-
iders, public health agencies, and others to enhance provider education
through continuing education events and through collaborative guidelines."
They can also alter their covered medicine policies (or formularies) to make
it more difficult for prescribers to act inappropriately. Insurers can review
drug coverage policies for whether their coverage reflects the most recent
state of evidence regarding safe and effective pain management.9 And they
can make it a practice to cover affordable strategies to quickly identify
7 See Zhou et al., supra note 62, at 828.
7 DEBORAH DOWELL ET AL., CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic
Pain-United States, 2016, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 18, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501el.htm [https://perma.cc/E3UF-568U].
1 For examples of these types of medications, see FDA Approves New Pain Pill Designed
to Be Hard to Abuse, supra note 49.
' Nathaniel P. Katz et al., Prescription Opioid Abuse: Challenges and Opportunities for
Payers, 19 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 295 (2013). For more on "abuse-deterrent formulations"
and how greater access to them can help to fight opioid addiction, see Kyle Simon et al.,
Abuse-Deterrent Formulations: Transitioning the Pharmaceutical Market to Improve Public
Health and Safety, 6 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES DRUG SAFETY 67, 74-75 (2015).
" Ensuring Safe and Appropriate Prescription Painkiller Use: The Important Role of
Community Health Plans, ALLIANCE OF CMTY. HEALTH PLANS (Nov. 2012), http://www.achp
.org/wp-content/uploads/ACHP-Brief-Ensuring-Safe-and-Appropriate-Prescription-Painkiller-
Usel .pdf [https://perma.cc/BVP2-X42U].
For example, Medicaid has recommended removing methadone from its list of preferred
drugs for pain management because it has been shown to be disproportionately linked to
opioid overdose death. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN,
BEST PRACTICES FOR ADDRESSING PRESCRIPTION OProlD OVERDOSES, MISUSE AND ADDICTION
(Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/cib-02-02-16
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K9N-ET3C].
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opioid abuse. For example, many insurers do not currently cover urine-
screening tests, which may disincentivize doctors from requiring them.s0
Insurers can also reduce the chance of abuse by limiting the number of
pills covered in a single prescription for painkillers. For example, if an indi-
vidual is having a single surgery, the opioid prescription can be limited to a
small amount, to lessen the chance that the individual extends use and risks
addiction.8' Insurers can also require step therapy, mandating that patients
try other non-addictive pain therapies first and limiting opioid "use to only
those patients for whom treatment with other pain medications is ineffec-
tive."82 Forty state Medicaid agencies engage in some form of quantity limit
or prior authorization in prescription painkillers.8 3 These activities are likely
enough to improve prescribing patterns by most well-intentioned prescribers.
Of course, many of these efforts also sharply limit availability of opioids, so
a balance must be struck between reducing the risk of addiction for patients
while also ensuring that those patients who need opioids get them.
Healthcare fraud and abuse laws are another mechanism to address
some problematic prescribing if it rises to the designated level of intent and/
or criminality.84 A 2012 study found that five state Medicaid agencies alone
paid sixty-three million dollars in fraudulent controlled substance prescrip-
tions and that efforts to find and enforce fraud were inadequate."5 With a
growing focus on healthcare fraud and growing funding being dedicated to
these efforts, private and public insurers can monitor their claims data to
identify providers who are outliers in their prescribing patterns.86 They can
also potentially use prescription drug monitoring programs to monitor pre-
scriptions that are not in their claims data, if, for example, a patient is claim-
ing coverage but also buying other prescriptions out-of-pocket." However,
' Dowell et al., supra note 75.
" Becker, supra note 72.
82 CMS BULLETIN, supra note 79, at 3.
" PEW CHARITABLE TkUSTS, CURBING PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE WrrIH PATIENT REVIEW
AND RESTRICTION PROGRAMS: LEARNING FROM MEDICAID AGENCIES (Mar. 28, 2016), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/03/curbing-prescription-drug-
abuse-with-patient-review-and-restriction-programs [https://perma.cclRT2X-9B9X]. By limit-
ing the quantity that can be prescribed in a single prescription, insurers have a better capacity
to review the frequency and duration of the use of the drug for any given patient. CMS BULLE-
TIN, supra note 79.
' For an extensive discussion of the intersections between opioid addiction and fraud and
abuse prosecutions, see Prescription for Peril: How Insurance Fraud Finances Theft and
Abuse of Addictive Prescription Drugs, COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD (Dec. 2007), http://
www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/drugDiversion.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMU2-CP2K].
85 PREVENTING PRESCRIPTION ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER,
supra note 12, at 1.
' While fraud and abuse laws are typically targeted at reclaiming stolen federal healthcare
funds (for example, wrongful prescribing in Medicare and Medicaid), private insurers can
monitor and try to recoup lost funds, too. For example, see the Public Private Partnership to
Prevent Healthcare Fraud where public and private insurers share strategies for tackling health-
care fraud and abuse. See, e.g., Public-Private Partnership to Prevent Health Care Fraud,
STOP MEDICAID FRAUD, http://www.stopmedicare/fraud.gov [https://perma.cc/WRG5-3B8
Y].
] Many states do not have access through their Medicaid systems to the PDMP either
because the state does not permit insurers access, or because that access has not been imple-
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fraud laws alone are not enough to tackle this epidemic. One reason is that
they require broad and constant enforcement, which can be costly. Also,
they are designed to target intentional and wrongful conduct-for example,
where a doctor bills for services he did not provide. Many doctors who over-
prescribe pain pills do not do so with criminal intent but out of a lack of
understanding of good medical practice surrounding pain management."
Insurers can use their claim data to monitor patients for signs of poten-
tial prescription painkiller abuse and intervene as needed.9 Drug utilization
review uses data to monitor groups of patients and individual patients at risk
of addiction or overdose. Insurers can monitor their insureds for instances
where patients are receiving high doses of opioids, high frequencies of pre-
scriptions, or are receiving opioids from multiple prescribers and
pharmacies.0
A related concept is the increasing use of patient review and restriction
programs (PRRs). Like drug utilization review, PRRs identify potential
abusers of opioids. However, instead of recommending treatment, PRRs re-
spond to risk by controlling the patient's access to further opioids. Opioid
access is limited to a single provider or single pharmacy, so as to better
mented. The same is true for private insurers. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 83, at
17. Davis argues that insurers should have broader access to PDMPs because this type of
population-level data is necessary to better understand trends occurring in the epidemic, just as
population-level data is needed to understand movements in any epidemic. See Corey Davis et
al., Addressing the Overdose Epidemic Requires Timely Access to Data to Guide Interventions,
35 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 383, 384 (2016).
By being able to monitor where more patient abusers are located and where more prescribers
or high-filling pharmacies are located, insurers may be able to target efforts at communities
and states where there is currently a more significant and immediate struggle. Insurers and
state agencies view this failure of access to PDMPs as a major barrier to recognizing problem-
atic prescribing in physicians and abuse in patients. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note
83, at 23. Such monitoring may also enable insurers and the government to use fraud laws to
go after patients who abuse opioids. This may be a positive act if insurers target patients who
are diverting and selling drugs, though it may be problematic if they are seeking to fine and
penalize significantly individuals who are addicted to and are abusing these drugs themselves.
An extreme example of such a scenario involves a woman who allegedly visited area hospitals
over 300 times with self-inflicted shoulder dislocations in order to obtain opioid prescriptions.
The defendant was accused of visiting 100 different hospitals across II states to obtain over
190 prescriptions pills at the cost of over $600,000 to her insurance, Highmark. Amy Wadas,
Feds: Woman Repeatedly Dislocated Shoulder to Get Pain Pills, CBS P=rSBURGH (May 31,
2016, 10:26 AM), http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2016/05/31/feds-woman-repeatedly-dislo-
cated-shoulder-to-get-pain-pills/ [https://perma.cc/Q72P-RWFD].
" Fraud and abuse laws typically require some sort of intentional misconduct on the part
of the healthcare provider, or at least something above mere negligence. In some fraud cases,
this can be easy to prove if, for example, a provider is billing for services they never provided.
Cases of wrongful prescribing, though, often go to the heart of provider discretion with respect
to what is appropriate medical care for their patients. As one example, did a physician pre-
scribe an overly large quantity of opioids for a patient because he engaged in reckless
medicine and did not appropriately monitor his patients, or did he take on patients who had
high tolerances for opioids and needed large doses for pain management? For more on the
tensions between fraud prosecutions and medical judgment, see generally Isaac D. Buck, Car-
ing Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act to Target Overtreatment, 74 OHio ST. L.J.
463 (2013).
" See Becker, supra note 72.
'See CMS BULLETIN, supra note 79, at 7.
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control the patient's use of drugs. PRRs frequently use a pharmacist, a clini-
cian, or a combination of healthcare workers to evaluate which patients may
be candidates for the PRR; they exclude patients who are more likely to
require extensive pain therapy (like cancer and sickle cell patients, patients
in long-term care, and patients in hospice), and they use multiple measure-
ments to determine who qualifies for PRR.1' Once a patient has been desig-
nated for PRR, there can be an opportunity for appeal, and patients may be
permitted to provide input on which provider or pharmacy they want to re-
tain.92 Medicare and Medicaid have implemented such efforts.93 Private in-
surers have also begun to follow suit, including major national insurers like
Cigna,94 Aetna,95 and Blue Cross." Private insurers are seeing significant
cost-savings through these efforts. For example, Aetna claims a fifteen per-
cent decline in opioid abuse across its four million members over a two-year
period after implementing such a program.97 Blue Cross claims a reduction
of six million pills across its Massachusetts insurance pool over an eighteen-
month period.98
9' Common criteria include visiting a designated number of unique pharmacies or unique
doctors over a given period of time, obtaining or filling a designated number of prescriptions,
or visiting an emergency room a designated number of times. Referrals are also possible by
providers who suspect a patient is abusing prescription drugs. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
supra note 83, at 8.
9 Id. at 12.
" Medicare monitors prescription drug utilization by its beneficiaries through the Medi-
care Overutilization Monitoring System in Medicare Part D. High-risk beneficiaries are identi-
fied and reported to Part D sponsors who must follow up and report their efforts back to CMS.
Medicare defines high-risk users as any beneficiary who has a morphine equivalent dose of
120 milligrams for at least 90 consecutive days, and receives their prescriptions from more
than three pharmacies or prescribers. Medicare Part D Overutilization Monitoring System
(OMS) Summary, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/
Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-11-03.html
[https://perma.cclE86B-CAEC]. Medicaid, as of December 2015, newly measures which pa-
tients have multiple prescriptions of high levels of opioids from more than one provider, as one
example. See CMS BULLETIN, supra note 79, at 7. PRR is very popular among Medicaid
agencies. Of fifty-two state Medicaid programs, forty-nine have some form of PRR with the
exceptions of California, South Dakota, and Puerto Rico. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note
83, at 3.
94 Moghe, supra note 60. Cigna is monitoring patient use and provider prescribing prac-
tices for signs of inappropriate activity. Cigna also provides hotlines to funnel patients into
available treatment centers. See One Insurer's Efforts to Assist in Massachusetts' Opioid Over-
dose Crisis, AM. Soc'y ADDICTION MED. (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.asam.org/magazinel
read/article/2016/03/11 /one-insurer-s-efforts-to-assist-in-massachusetts-opioid-overdose-crisis
[https://perma.cc/PAF6-YGDE]; Katz, supra note 77 (discussing patient screening generally).
9 Aetna's program limits the number of available pills for at-risk patients, notifies phar-
macies if they are filling scripts at outlier rates, refers high-using patients to behavioral health,
and, where patients decline offers of assistance and treatment, limits medicine to a single
provider or a limited number of refills. PREVENTING PRESCRIPTION ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, supra note 12, at 3.
96 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts's program limits opioids to two successive
fifteen-day prescriptions. To prescribe more than thirty days of such medicine within a two-





b. Treating Existing Cases of Prescription Painkiller Addiction
Insurers can also ensure that addiction treatments and other related ther-
apies are adequately covered for those already struggling with addiction to
opioids.9 9 Historically, insurers have not funded addiction treatment as gen-
erously as other costly medical services like cardiac care or organ trans-
plant.'oo Addicted patients were sometimes excluded from enrollment in
insurance or charged very high premiums."' Some insurers also opted not to
cover addiction services, or pushed the costs of these services back onto
patients through very high co-pays.102 One reason for this lack of parity be-
tween medical care and addiction services may be stigma; if addiction disor-
ders are perceived as the fault of the addicted and not worthy of treatment,
then regulators and the public will be less likely to press for equal cover-
age.103 Additionally, some may believe that addiction treatment is too costly
and will raise insurance premiums too significantly, placing burdens on
other insureds and taxpayers.'1 However, adequately treating addiction
through the healthcare system can save taxpayers dollars in other ways, such
as by improving workplace productivity and reducing accidents, death, and
involvement in the criminal justice system.10
The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse has published
guidelines on adequate substance abuse treatment.1" Patients must have ac-
cess to adequate screening and diagnosis of addiction; withdrawal manage-
" Lynn R. Webster, Pills, Policies, and Predicaments: The Unintended Consequences of a
Health Care System's Policy Toward Opioids, 14 PAIN MED. 1439, 1439 (2013). Webster, as
President of the American Academy of Pain Medicine, says that insurers can better fund ac-
cess to addiction services, and better address the mental health needs of patients that can
sometimes be tied to substance abuse. See Uncovering Coverage Gaps: A Review of Addiction
Benefits in ACA Plans, NATL CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE ii (June 7, 2016),
http://www.centeronaddiction.org/download/file/fid/1678 [https://perma.cc/K7QK-UT75]
(observing that "[c]omprehensive insurance coverage for addiction, alone, will not eradicate
the ooid crisis-but it is essential").
See Sonja B. Starr, Simple Fairness: Ending Discrimination in Health Insurance Cov-
erage of Addiction Treatment, 111 YALE L.J. 2321, 2325 (2002).
1o' See id. at 2359; see also Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Worthy, Achieving Real Par-
ity: Increasing Access to Treatment for Substance Use Disorders Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act and the Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act, 36 U. ARK. LIrrLE
ROCK L. REV. 555, 570 (2014).
"n See Starr, supra note 100, at 2323; Barnes & Worthy, supra note 101, at 572.
103 See Starr, supra note 100, at 2321; Barnes & Worthy, supra note 101, at 557.
'" See Barnes & Worthy, supra note 101, at 557. Additionally, it has been common prac-
tice pre-ACA for insurers to avoid covering preventive services. See Sara Rosenbaum, New
Directions for Health Insurance Design: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice,
31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94, 98 (2003).
1o' See Principles of Drug Addiction Treatment: A Research-Based Guide, NAT'L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE 13 (3d ed. 2012), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-addic-
tion-treatment-research-based-guide-third-edition/frequently-asked-questions/drug-addiction-
treatment-worth-its-cost [https://perma.cc/J2R7-745K].
" EHB Recommendations for States: Critical Addiction Prevention and Treatment Bene-
fits for Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark Plans, NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUB-
STANCE ABUSE (July 2013), http://www.centeronaddiction.org/sites/default/files/files/8_3%20
EHB-recs-for-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H2A-JARQ].
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ment and detoxification services; addiction treatment, including medical and
psychosocial services; and long-term monitoring.0 Insurers can improve ac-
cess to addiction services by ensuring that he insurance adequately covers
cutting-edge addiction services that are comprehensive, and by reducing bar-
riers to access, including pre-authorization requirements and high cost shar-
ing.'"0 Insurers are already beginning some of these efforts to better cover
addiction treatment, for example, by including state-of-the-art addiction
treatments in insurance plans and following up with patients in detox pro-
grams to better coordinate their addiction care.'" But there is a long way to
go to achieve truly successful addiction care for the population.
While insurers may not seek generous addiction benefits of their own
initiative, regulations and laws have gone a long way toward mandating that
insurers be more generous in their coverage of addiction services. All of the
reforms that have led to more generous benefits face the threat of repeal
under the new Trump Administration now or in the future. Thus, these bene-
fits should be assessed not only on the basis of the good they do now but
also in terms of- any harms that might attend their repeal.
Most importantly, under the ACA, substance abuse disorders can no
longer be treated as a preexisting condition."10 Insurers are not allowed to
discriminate against patients who suffer from addiction"' with respect to
premiums"2 or enrollment. Those with addiction can thus purchase insur-
ance at the same rates and eligibility as others, when they might previously
have been excluded because of their addiction.
The ACA also mandates that insurers cover certain drugs and therapies
as essential health benefits.1' While many insurers may have opted to ex-
clude these drugs in the past,114 insurers are now mandated to cover mental
health and substance abuse disorder (SUD) services as one of the ten essen-
'" See id. at 5-8.
o See, e.g., One Insurer's Efforts to Assist in Massachusetts' Opioid Overdose Crisis,
supra note 94.
'o Becker, supra note 72.
no For a broad and introductory overview of the ACA's many reforms to the healthcare
system, especially reforms of the private insurance system, see Summary of the Affordable
Care Act, KAISER FANHLY FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/sum-
mary-of-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/QKB9-ZXND]. For the relevant provision
banning discrimination by insurers on the basis of all preexisting medical conditions, including
substance abuse, see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 2702-05, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300gg-1-300gg-4.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012). Insurers may not also discriminate in insurance renew-
als. See id. at 300gg-1-300gg-4.
112 See id. at section 300gg.
11 See id. at § 18022(b)(1). EHBs require coverage of some medical care in ten key areas,
including ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and new-
born care, mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treat-
ment, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory
services, preventive and wellness services, chronic disease management, and pediatric ser-
vices, including oral and vision care.
114 See Dowell, supra note 75 (noting that "patient cost can be a barrier to buprenorphine




tial health benefits."5 Insurers must cover at least one opioid dependence
drug, like suboxone.116 Insurers must also cover one opioid overdose reversal
agent, like naloxone."7 Naloxone and similar drugs are fast-acting opioid
reversal agents that can be deployed during an opioid overdose to reverse the
overdose and save the patient's life. Naloxone is widely available in pharma-
cies, and public servants like Emergency Medical Technicians and police
officers are increasingly carrying naloxone and being trained on how to ad-
minister it."'
Beyond these mandates, however, insurers have discretion in which
types of addiction treatments they will cover. One ongoing area of contro-
versy is whether insurers must cover medication-assisted treatment
(MAT)." 9 MATs combine drugs with behavioral therapy, detox, and other
methods and have been proven to enhance the likelihood of recovery from
opioid addiction.120 While the cost of a single regimen of MATs is negligible
compared to many other drugs (at seventy-six dollars per week), the cumula-
tive cost may be significant, as the population using MATs has increased
significantly and will likely only increase.121 The Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has yet to issue definitive guidance on whether in-
surers are mandated to cover MATs but has discussed issuing specific MAT
guidance in the future.12 2 In March 2016, the Obama Administration also put
forth a number of other efforts to enhance MAT access.123 Similar debates
... HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,203 (Mar.
8, 2016).
116 See NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SU1STANCE ABUSE, supra note 99. Methadone is not
explicitly required to be covered by the ACA and is not covered by Medicare Part D. See also
Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2017, supra note 115, where DHHS, in its
annual guidance on benefits and regulations of the insurance market, acknowledged that the
EHB provision requires insurers to cover "medications to treat opioid dependence."
inId.
"1 For arguments on the importance of naloxone as a broader policy strategy to reduce the
opioid epidemic and its attending harms, see Dineen, PSYCHOL. REV., supra note 30, at 75-77.
"' For a discussion of the importance of MAT as a leading evidence-based standard for
addiction treatment and various policy considerations to enhance access, see Barbara Andraka-
Christou, America Needs the TREAT Act: Expanding Access to Effective Medication for Treat-
ing Addiction, 26 HEALTH MATRIx 309 (2016).
'
20 See Medication-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Addiction, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE
2 (Apr. 2012), https://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/tib-mat-opioid.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4VRE-GPVW].
121 See Steven Ross Johnson, Medication-Assisted Addiction Treatment Faces Cost and
Payment Concerns, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare
.com/article/20151230/NEWS/151239992 [https://perma.cc/6YLG-68LR].
122 In comment periods, a mandate to cover some MATs met mixed reviews. Many com-
mentators supported the inclusion of MATs under EHBs, citing cost-effectiveness and clinical
success rates. Commentators also emphasized that insurers have placed limits on MATs
through utilization review, and some states have excluded MATs from their model state plans,
meaning a federal mandate could improve access. Some insurers argued against the inclusion
of MATs in EHBs, worried that being locked in to any single drug therapy could prohibit them
from competing with pharmaceutical companies for lower prices. See Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2017, supra note 115. Increased funding is available to both the states
and community health centers to enhance availability of MATs.
123 These include funding to community health centers and to states to enhance availability
of MATs. See Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Announces Additional Actions to Address the
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about MAT coverage have been playing out in other federal healthcare pro-
grams. 124 It is unclear what the current Trump Administration will do with
respect to this issue.
The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008
(MHPAEA) also monitors insurance coverage of addiction services.'2 The
law requires group health plans to ensure that any treatment restrictions (like
limits on the number of days covered, frequency of visits, etc.) and financial
restrictions (copays, deductibles, out-of-pocket expenses) not be any greater
for addiction services than for other medical or surgical services.12 6 The final
regulation also requires parity in non-quantitative treatment restrictions, like
requirements for step therapy or pre-authorizations.127 In addition, to the ex-
tent an insurer covers services in certain settings (like outpatient, inpatient,
out-of-network, drug prescription, and emergency services), it must also
cover addiction services in those same settings.128 While the MHPAEA did
not apply to small-group or individual insurers, the ACA extended the
MHPAEA requirements to those insurers offering insurance on federal and
state insurance exchanges through the EHB provisions.12 9 Still, the law has
been critiqued because it fails to actually mandate coverage of addiction
services, instead only requiring that, if offered, they be offered in parity with
other services.3 0
In practice, insurers are falling short of these mandates. In a study of all
2017 state benchmark plans which set the baseline standard for what many
private insurers must cover, over two-thirds did not comply with ACA EHB
requirements for substance abuse coverage."' Twenty states' plans did not
cover an opioid reversal agent, two states' plans wrongfully imposed lifetime
limits for addiction services, one plan did not cover adequate diagnosis and
screening for substance abuse, and some plans did not address coverage for
Prescription Opioid Abuse and Heroin Epidemic, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 29, 2016), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/29/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announ
ces-additional-actions-address [https://perma.cc/7TXD-FAP3].
124 These include TRICare, the healthcare program for active duty military, and the Fed-
eral Employee Health Benefits program. See id.
25 See Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), Pub. L. No.
110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
126 For example, an insurer cannot impose a deductible to see an addiction therapist that is
not also imposed on a diabetes patient, or place a limit of only two visits per month that is
unique to addiction service and not also applicable to other non-addiction services. Id.
127 Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812 (2016); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712 (2016); 45
C.F.R. §§ 146.136, 147.136, 147.160 (2016).
' See Barnes & Worthy, supra note 101.
129 See id. The MHPAEA does not apply to public insurers, with some exceptions for
managed care elements of CHIP/Medicaid. See Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act
(MHPAEA), CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INSURANCE OVERSIGHT, https://www.cms.gov/cciio/
programs-and-initiatives/other-insurance-protections/mhpaea factsheet.htm#Regulation
[https://perma.cclRBZ7-9MFV]. The states also may have their own versions of such laws
that may be more stringent than the MHPAEA. See Barnes & Worthy, supra note 101, at 558.
1" See Barnes & Worthy, supra note 101, at 568.
131 See NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 99, at 11.
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addiction screening for adolescents.13 2 Likewise, many insurers have failed
to comply with mental health parity laws.'33 Thirty-three states required prior
authorization for a range of addiction services, which might delay or prevent
access.3 4 Some states have significant cost sharing for addiction services (as
high as $500-2500 per day or $750 copayments).13 5 A number of states, in
their model plans, are placing limits on inpatient and outpatient addiction
services only or lifetime limits on addiction services (and id not place those
same limits on other clinical services).'" Some states did not include coin-
surance for addiction services as part of the annual out-of-pocket limit, leav-
ing extra costs on the patient.137 Eighty-eight percent of state plans did not
provide sufficient detail in their policy statements for regulators to be able to
see whether the plans were in compliance with EHB and mental health par-
ity laws.'38 The reasons why these state plans are falling short may be many,
but one reason may be that states are reluctant to set too high of a bar if they
only have a few insurers offering insurance on their marketplaces. They may
also fear that more generous coverage will result in spiked premiums, driv-
ing consumer backlash.
Insurers clearly hold great promise in their ability to change the scope
of the prescription painkiller crisis. They are already changing prescribing
patterns, monitoring patients for signs of abuse, intervening when necessary,
and promoting plans that offer sufficient addiction services. Despite the lack
of widespread federal regulation, insurers are already making various
changes in a piecemeal way. The next part advocates for a broader regula-
tory examination of what efforts are occurring at the insurer level (public
and private) and considers some of the perils if regulators fail to anticipate
and address some of the goals of insurers that may run counter to the broader
public health aim of resolving this epidemic.
III. THE NEED FOR REGULATORY REVIEW OF INSURANCE PRACTICES
As the previous parts have suggested, insurers have the power and clear
incentives to curb prescription painkiller abuse, and they are acting accord-
ingly. In some instances, insurers are acting on their own volition out of the
interest of driving down healthcare costs, for example by attempting to pre-
vent wasteful and inappropriate prescribing. In other circumstances, insurers
are being forced to make changes to comply with regulations. For example,
they are more generously covering addiction treatments because of the ACA
and the Mental Health Parity Act.




'" Id. at 3.
137 Id. at 32, 35.
'
3
1 Id. at 1.
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The federal government has yet to undertake a widespread effort to
consider the role of insurers in addressing this epidemic. In doing this, regu-
lators should take into account some key considerations and pitfalls that can
arise as insurers increasingly engage this epidemic. In this part, I consider
three key issues that regulators might consider. First, our insurance system is
heavily fragmented, meaning that a concerted federal effort will be neces-
sary to ensure that any changes by insurers are widespread. Second, there is
a risk that insurers' strategies to reduce opioid abuse will result in discrimi-
nation against those in poor health, significantly worsening the plight of the
addicted. Regulators should pay particular attention to any efforts by insur-
ers to reduce care, and whether such efforts achieve broader health goals.
They should also be aware of the need to incentivize insurers to cover costly
(but health-beneficial treatments) like comprehensive addiction services.
Lastly, insurers are not necessarily seeking the same goals as the public in
this realm. Insurers worry about their insureds', not necessarily the wider
public's, health, so enlisting them in a public health crisis requires caution
and consideration for the impact on third parties.
A. Fragmentation of Health Insurance
Healthcare financing in the United States is often criticized for being
highly fragmented.139 We have different health insurance programs abiding
by different laws for the elderly, the poor, veterans, active-duty military,
children, employed persons, and others.14 Yet the prescription painkiller epi-
demic is sweeping and widespread, and few populations appear immune to
it.141 Abusers of opioids can be found in any of the populations above.142 To
the extent that insurers are a critical element of the battle against prescription
painkiller abuse, this fragmentation is problematic. There are simply too
many insurers, private and public, likely resulting in inconsistent and patch-
work efforts without uniform regulation.143
Moreover, even after the ACA, approximately ten percent of our non-
elderly population remains without health insurance.'4 To the extent these
individuals are obtaining and abusing opioids, they are doing so outside of
139 See, e.g., John Noseworthy, Overcoming Fragmentation in Health Care, HARV. Bus.
REV. (Oct. 11, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/creating-a-sustainable-model-for-health-care
[https://perma.cclF6SQ-9PZ9].
1" For an overview of where individuals get their health coverage, see Health Insurance
Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/
total-population/?currentTimeframe=O [https://perma.cc/6BH5-RQFJ].
141 See Specific Populations and Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse, SUBSTANCE ABUSE
& MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/prescription-drug-misuse-abuse/
specific-populations [https://perma.cc/KYG9-ZLP7].
42 See id.
143 See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Public Health Emergencies and the Public Health/Man-
aged Care Challenge, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 63, 64 (2002).





the healthcare payment system, and many remedies by insurers cannot reach
them. Worse still, these individuals will likely not have adequate access to
addiction services without some form of health insurance.145 This is particu-
larly true in the course of rural opioid abuse, where rural residents may be
without adequate access to healthcare and financing.146 And even for those
who have access to insurance, rehabilitation has frequently been inade-
quately covered, as earlier sections suggest.147 This may be even more signif-
icant if the new Congress repeals the ACA or eliminates its essential health
benefits provision mandating coverage of certain addiction services.'14
Appropriate coverage of necessary pain medicine and coverage for ad-
diction services are both critical. Regulators must consider how to more
widely ensure access to these services, particularly for the uninsured, and
this may prove even more difficult if the ACA is repealed and many people
lose coverage.14 9 Regulators may leverage the overwhelming bipartisan
backing of opioid reforms (as shown in the passage of the Comprehensive
Addiction and Recovery Act) to advocate for expansive coverage of addic-
tion treatment across the uninsured and the various types of health insurance
programs.
B. Health-Status Discrimination
Insurers hold a great deal of power over prescribers and patients that
they can leverage to reduce abusive opioid practices, and they are already
beginning to use this power to that end. However, to achieve positive public
health goals of preventing and fully treating painkiller abuse, regulators must
ensure that insurers use this power in a way that does not discriminate
against patients, particularly on the basis of their health status.
In short, insurers are wired to avoid and minimize risk and, in the case
of healthcare, risk equates with expensive healthcare consumption.5 0 This is
145 Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 96.
146 Lisa R. Pruitt, The Forgotten Fifth: Rural Youth and Substance Abuse, 20 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 359, 388-89 (2009).
147 In the past, people frequently had to pay out-of-pocket for treatment for addiction, or
insurers have limited the number of covered days. See Ben Allen, When Rehab Might Help an
Addict-But Insurance Won't Cover It, NPR (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2015/08/16/430437514/when-rehab-might-help-an-addict-but-insurance-wont-
cover-it [https://perma.cclNNS8-PKXZ].
148 Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, House G.O.P. Leaders Outline Plan to Replace Obama
Health Care Act, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/polit-
ics/affordable-care-act-congress.html [https://perma.cclPSP-4PCW].
149 Rosenbaum has discussed how the failure to have a portion of the population with
insurance is a public health threat in and of itself, as it means a failure to finance their needed
healthcare in public health emergencies or epidemics. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 95.
" Jessica L. Roberts, "Healthism": A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to
Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, U. ILL. L. REv. 1159, 1163 (2012) ("charging
insureds rates based on their relative risk . . . [is] exactly what allow[s] health insurers to
profit."); see also Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What's Insurance Got to Do With It?
Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 436,
441 (2010).
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true for both public and private insurers, but it is particularly true for for-
profit private insurers who are responsible to their shareholders to ensure
profits.'1 Particularly, insurers appear to act independently in seeking to re-
duce harmful prescribing patterns, likely because it proves costly. But regu-
lation has been necessary to make insurers more generous in covering
addiction treatment.
The ACA has implemented a variety of insurance reforms to protect the
sick from insurance discrimination.5 2 For example, insurers regulated by the
ACA cannot increase premiums,153 cannot deny enrollment because of pre-
existing conditions or level of healthcare usage,'TM and are limited in the
amount they can require in out-of-pocket spending per annum.'15 Benefits
are standardized through the essential health benefits provision so that all
insurers must cover the same services, and thus cannot avoid the sick by
failing to cover services they most often need.156 This is with the aim of
ensuring affordable and meaningful access to healthcare for those who need
it. 157
These changes have proven critical to protecting the access to health-
care of people with addictions.' The ACA's reforms prevent insurers from
excluding people with addictions from their plans, or from charging them
'51 Mariner, supra note 150, at 441-43. For an extensive discussion of examples of how
insurers discriminated in the individual, private insurance market prior to the ACA, see gener-
ally How Accessible Is Individual Health Insurance for Consumers in Less-Than-Perfect
Health?, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 2001), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress
.com/2013/01/how-accessible-is-individual-health-insurance-for-consumer-in-less-than-per-
fect-health-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SEV-TPS3] (detailing wide-ranging discrimination
from serious conditions like HIV to minor health conditions like hay fever, particularly in
small group and individual health insurance where risk cannot be as readily pooled across
groups).
152 For a discussion of historical patterns of discrimination by insurers against the sick, see
generally Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 73, 81-108 (2005). Specifically, insurers have to adjust for adverse selection,
that is, the phenomenon whereby individuals only purchase health insurance when they know
that they need it. Also, insurers must adjust for moral hazard, the phenomenon where individu-
als, once they have insurance, are more likely to use it. Both phenomena mean that insureds
will come into the market and heavily use it without having paid in. See Thomas L. Greaney,
Regulating to Promote Competition in Designing Health Insurance Exchanges, 20 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 237, 242 (2011).
153 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2701, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
154 Id. at § 300gg-1. Insurers also may not discriminate in insurance renewals. Id. at
§ 300gg-2.
.55 See Out-of-Pocket Maximum/Limit, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
glossary/out-of-pocket-maximum-limit/ [https://perma.cc/GJD2-YR39].
156 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1). EHBs require coverage of some medical care in ten key
areas, including ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity
and newborn care, mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral
health treatment, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, labo-
ratory services, preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, and pediat-
ric services, including oral and vision care. See id.
'' Sara Rosenbaum, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Implications for
Public Health Policy and Practice, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 130, 131 (2011) (explaining that
"[t]he purpose of these standards, as noted, is to ban discrimination against women, older
people, and children and adults in less than perfect health").
' NATL CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 99.
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different premiums and copays. The ACA also mandates more equitable cov-
erage of mental health and addiction treatments than insurers were apt to
provide pre-ACA. These reforms may have some shortcomings.'59 Mainly,
they require greater compliance, for example, in monitoring states to ensure
that their model plans are in compliance with the ACA and the Mental
Health Parity Act. '6 However, on the whole, the ACA has proven critical in
reducing discrimination against the addicted by insurers.
However, the ACA is under threat, and all of these protections may be
dismantled. Many of those who seek to repeal the ACA seek to reduce insur-
ance regulation too, meaning that insurers could be free once again to dis-
criminate against he addicted in enrollment, premiums, and benefits.
. If the ACA (or some parts of it) is repealed, regulators must stand ready
to assess insurers' changing practices around the opioid epidemic. Many of
these efforts by insurers to reduce harmful prescribing can be powerful tools
of change with ACA safeguards in place, but can quickly turn discriminatory
if these protections are repealed or diminished.
Take the example of drug utilization review and patient review and re-
striction programs. Insurers are currently finding great cost savings in de-
tecting and stopping abusive patients, reducing costly cases of new addiction
by implementing the patient review and restriction program and drug utiliza-
tion reviews that closely monitor patient drug consumption.161 By preventing
new cases of addiction, these programs can be powerful tools to control this
epidemic. These programs allow insurers to quickly spot possible abuse,
control the flow of opioids to these patients, and properly refer patients for
addiction services, when eeded.162 Many insurers are already undertaking
these programs, and regulators could easily require that all insurers, govern-
ment or private, do so. -
However, the same intensive monitoring that once meant help for the
addicted could quickly become a snare to catch and discriminate. All of this
information on patient drug abuse would now be a treasure trove of informa-
tion about how to assess and avoid risk. Without the ACA's protections, in-
formation about potential drug abuse by insureds could be used to raise their
premiums or cost sharing, remove them from the plan altogether, exclude
159 For a comprehensive overview of areas where the ACA has failed to fully eliminate
health status discrimination, see generally John V. Jacobi et al., Health Insurer Market Behav-
ior After the Affordable Care Act: Assessing the Need for Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement,
and Regulatory Reform, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 109 (2015). For an argument that the Mental
Health Parity Act's limitations may inhibit its full redressing of discrimination in mental health
and addiction, see generally Ellen Weber, Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage:
Will the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 179 (2013). For a discussion of how mental health parity laws and the ACA
both fail to fully address addiction treatment, see generally Amanda Flood, Substance Use
Disorder Parity Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Improvements Made,
but Further Government Action Needed to Guarantee Full Parity in the Private Insurance
Market, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 363 (2015).
6 See NAT L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SussTANcE ABusE, supra note 99.
'6' See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
'62 See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
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addiction services from their specific plans, or impose annual or lifetime
limits on addiction services or other services.163 Insurers might discriminate
not just against those addicted to these drugs, but also those who are show-
ing signs of becoming addicted.
Some may argue that this does not place the addicted in a position any
worse off than they would have been pre-ACA when insurers regularly dis-
criminated on the basis of addiction. But this argument fails to recognize that
insurers have been developing new and comprehensive practices to detect
addiction that were not in place prior to the ACA. With these enhanced abili-
ties to detect addiction (or those at risk of it) and the freedom to discriminate
again under an ACA repeal, we could see significantly more discrimination
against those who are addicted and even those who are at risk of addiction.
As another example, while insurers acted without regulatory mandates
to help spot and reduce wrongful prescribing, they likely did so because it
proved financially beneficial to them without being costly in its own right.
But it took regulations to make insurers cover addiction treatments more
comprehensively, because, without regulations, insurers may favor minimiz-
ing that coverage so as to keep premiums low and be able to better compete
for healthier enrollees. The ACA and the Mental Health Parity Act both
mandate broader coverage of addiction services to treat opioid dependence.
If these mandates or their regulations were repealed, insurers may opt to
reduce coverage of addiction services significantly, again with an aim of risk
avoidance.
Given these considerations, policymakers hould begin a number of ef-
forts. First, they must start monitoring the practices that insurers are cur-
rently engaged in to tackle this epidemic. Good practices could be
implemented across all insurance, while harmful practices could be banned
or monitored. Second, regulators must consider the risk of discrimination
posed by these programs if the ACA is repealed. Policymakers can imple-
ment rules to ensure that insurers' drug monitoring and patient utilization
review programs reduce opioid abuse without discriminating against ad-
dicted or potentially addicted patients. Lastly, regulators can monitor insur-
ers for whether their addiction benefits are adequate. Even if the ACA
remains intact, there are clear instances of lack of monitoring and enforce-
ment than regulators can improve upon. If the ACA is repealed, policymak-
ers should anticipate that the changes insurers have made to improve
benefits will drop off. Policymakers may use the popular support around
opioid addiction to advocate, again, for better coverage of addiction services.
C. Insurance as a Tool to Achieve Public Health Changes
In addition to considering the issued discussed above, policymakers and
regulators should draw upon past experiences in regulating insurers during
public health crises.
163 See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
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Past epidemics and public health crises tell us that insurers must be
engaged on some level, as it is too costly to expect the government to shoul-
der the full price of any epidemic."6 Certainly, there are examples of policy-
makers successfully leveraging insurance to obtain public health goals.'16
Yet, there is a disconnect between health insurance and public health
aims. Insurers are not focused on the health of the entire population, or even
the population of those suffering from prescription painkiller abuse. They
are only responsible for their own insureds, and their insureds are the only
individuals whom they can reach with many of their initiatives. While insur-
ers have incentives to combat epidemics if they lead to costly consumption
of medical services, their solutions may not always advance public health
goals.
-Some scholars have explored the role of private insurance during other
public health crises, such as floods or flu pandemics. In these contexts,
scholars agree that insurers' incentives do not always align perfectly with
broader public health goals and that regulation is necessary to encourage
such alignment.66 Indeed, this is because health insurance is a fundamentally
different exercise from public health.67
This tension between the broader public health aims of policymakers
seeking to address the prescription drug abuse crisis and the aims of insurers
could be further exposed over time, particularly if the ACA is repealed.
'" Rosenbaum et al., supra note 143, at 65-66 ("Of course, a government may elect to
bypass the issue of coverage and directly bear the costs, out of general or dedicated revenues,
associated with treating a population both during and following the immediate period of a
public health emergency. But while government may use direct financing for certain services
and activities, public health emergencies can be expected to have costly and long-term physi-
cal and mental health consequences, thus making ongoing direct government financing
through 'extra-contractual' coverage less feasible. Because the American health care system is
built on an expectation that necessary medical care will be financed through insurance cover-
age (indeed, virtually all states, for example, now define 'prudent layperson' emergencies as a
covered benefit in state-regulated managed care contracts), indefinite reliance on direct gov-
ernment financing would appear to be at odds with the operation of the medical care system
itself. At some point, it becomes important to reconcile insurance financing and public health
princi les.").
For example, Medicare expanded its program to cover prescription drugs under Part D
to ensure that elderly patients were able to control their medical conditions affordably. Indeed,
the ACA itself can arguably be described as tinkering with the insurance system to achieve a
broader health aim of improving access to healthcare for the broader population. See J.G.
Hodge et al., Congress, Courts, and Commerce: Upholding the Individual Mandate to Protect
the Public's Health, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHics 394, 394-96 (2011) (arguing that health reforms
regulating insurance "are not simply aimed at regulating the health insurance industry or indi-
vidual actors, but rather seek to advance a core public health objective of improving access to
health care services"); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 94.
166 See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 143, at 65. For example, the authors point to an
epidemic of measles in Wisconsin in the 1980s that occurred because the state Medicaid
agency was not required to cover vaccination as part of its benefits. The sheer existence of the
epidemic (and any related cost of treating the disease for the state) was not enough for the state
agency to act, and policies had to be later added to ensure that vaccination would be covered in
the future. See id.
167 See Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 102.
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Regulators must recognize this and recognize what it means-it means
that insurers' goals cannot naturally be expected to align with the goals of
public health. It means that regulation is necessary to bring insurers' incen-
tives into proper alignment. Regulators can look to the past for examples of
successful and unsuccessful engagement of insurers during epidemics and
can consider insurers' individual interests and the ways in which they may
differ from the goals of public health.
CONCLUSION
The potential for insurers to effect real change in the prescription pain-
killer epidemic is significant. Insurers are one of a few primary gatekeepers
of prescription painkillers, and their position at the top of the chain means
that they can control prescriber behaviors and monitor patient uptake. Their
participation in regulatory efforts to combat abuse is necessary to ensure that
opioids are given where appropriate and not given where inappropriate. De-
spite their power (and their own vested interests in combating this abuse),
insurers have been under-examined by regulators as a stakeholder in the pre-
scription painkiller epidemic and an agent for change. This is unfortunate
because engaging these entities could improve patient outcomes, but also
because change is already happening among insurers, and regulators must
evaluate whether these changes are for the better. Regulators should consider
innovations occurring on the insurance market and think critically about how
best to engage insurers in the battle for our nation's recovery. Particularly if
the ACA is repealed, regulators should be prepared to consider and mitigate
the risk of discrimination by insurers against those struggling with addiction.
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